During the 1990s many states extended Medicaid eligibility to low-income parents who were not receiving welfare. We evaluate the effects of those expansions on health insurance coverage. To account for unobservable differences between expansion states and non-expansion states that may be correlated with both policy decisions and insurance coverage, we employ a within-state difference-in-difference technique that makes use of data only from expansion states. We find that the parental eligibility expansions increased Medicaid coverage of mothers with only small effects on private coverage. The expansions also increased the coverage of children, presumably by raising the benefit to the family of applying for coverage. We find substantial racial and ethnic differences in the effects of the expansions. As a result, the expansions help reduce racial and ethnic gaps in insurance coverage, particularly for adults.
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I. Introduction
A growing body of evidence indicates that health insurance promotes health (Levy and Meltzer 2001) . This seems to be particularly true among children and lowincome adults (Brook, et al. 1983; Keeler, et al. 1985; Lurie et al. 1986; Currie and Gruber 1997) . Because of the important links between health insurance and health, the lack of insurance among 41.2 million Americans --a disproportionate number of whom are poor--is widely regarded as a pressing public policy issue.
One reason for low coverage among the low-income population is that low-wage employers, who employ a disproportionate share of low-income workers, often do not provide their workers with coverage. Even among firms that do, evidence suggests that low wage workers often are unwilling to pay the price of insurance that they and their employers face (Long and Marquis, 1992) . Individual coverage obtained directly from insurers is more expensive still.
Furthermore, until recently, public coverage under Medicaid was not generally available to working families. Historically, most families had to receive welfare in order to be eligible for Medicaid coverage.
1 Between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, poor children increasingly became eligible for Medicaid under the so-called poverty-related eligibility expansio ns, which extended eligibility to children in non-welfare families who 1 Exceptions are coverage through the Medicaid Medically Needy Program (MN) and the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). In 2000, 35 states offered a MN program which covers persons who do not meet the applicable income or resource requirements for categorically needy eligibility but who, largely because they have incurred considerable medical costs, may become eligible. Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia automatically provide Medicaid coverage to the poor disabled who are eligible for SSI benefits. Both programs, however, constitute only a small portion of total Medicaid enrollment: the former 3.6 million (8 percent) and the latter 5.3 million (12 percent).
2 met income-eligibility limits determined by state and federal governments. 2 The State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which was introduced in 1997, expanded children's eligibility further still. However, with the exception of pregnant women, adults remained largely ineligible for Medicaid unless they received welfare or were disabled.
Beginning in the 1990s, a number of states began expanding eligibility to lowincome parents who were not receiving welfare. The impetus for many of these expansions was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). PRWORA is best known for replacing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. However, PRWORA also required states to formally separate
Medicaid eligibility from welfare eligibility by replacing their AFDC-related eligibility criteria with so-called "family eligibility" criteria. Although many states merely established new family eligibility criteria for Medicaid that were identical to their old AFDC-related eligibility criteria, several states used the new flexibility granted them under PRWORA to raise the income-eligibility limits for adults well beyond their former levels. Other states expanded eligibility under research and demonstration waivers.
In this paper, we analyze how these parental-eligibility expansions affected insurance coverage. We base the analysis on data from the March annual demographic supplement of the Current Population Survey and focus on expansions implemented between 1996 and 2001. We estimate first how the expansions have affected Medicaid coverage among adults. To determine whether Medicaid coverage crowded out private 3 coverage, we estimate the effect of the expansions on private coverage and the likelihood of having any coverage.
We also estimate whether there were spillover effects on the coverage of children.
The parental eligibility expansions did not expand eligibility for children, because income-eligibility limits for children under the poverty-related Medicaid expansions and SCHIP were generally higher than those under the parental-eligibility expansions.
Nevertheless, the parental-eligibility expansions may have raised the benefit to lowincome parents of applying for coverage, since both the adults and the children could become insured. If so, the parental-eligibility expansions potentially could increase child coverage as well as adult coverage.
Finally, we ask whether the effect of the parental eligibility expansions varies by race and ethnicity. Wages and occupations vary by race and ethnicity, which may affect availability of employer-provided coverage. Marriage rates vary as well, which may affect the likelihood of coverage under a spouse's employer-provided policy. Depending on how the effects of the parental eligibility expansions vary by race and ethnicity, the expansions could either reduce or exacerbate differentials in health care coverage.
One of the key challenges in estimating the effects of the parental-eligibility expansions is distinguishing the effects of the expansions themselves from the effects of other, potentially unobservable factors that might simultaneously influence both health insurance coverage on the one hand and state policy choices on the other. In the welfare reform literature, this has been referred to as the "policy endogeneity" problem. This issue is of particular concern in the policy environment of the 1990s, in which states not To do this we focus only on the expansion states, and define two groups of families according to states' pre-and post-expansion Medicaid-eligibility criteria. One is the target group, defined as families whose incomes lie between the AFDC-related income eligibility limit and 200 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL). Adults in these families would have been income-ineligible for welfare, and thus for Medicaid, prior to the expansion, but many of them would have become eligible for Medicaid as a result of the expansion. The other group is the below-target group, whose incomes fall below the AFDC income-eligibility limit. These groups would have been income-eligible for
Medicaid both before and after the expansion. As a result, their coverage should not change as a result of the parental-eligibility expansions. 3 We construct our estimates of the effect of the parental eligibility expansions by comparing post-expansion changes in coverage differentials between the target group and the below-target group. Since these between-group coverage differentials can be computed within cells defined by state and year, our approach implicitly controls for all arbitrarily time-varying state-specific factors that may potentially influence both insurance coverage and state policy choices.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the parental eligibility expansions in more detail and review the few previous studies that have analyzed their effects. In section III we discuss the data. Section IV describes our empirical strategy more formally; section V presents our results. Section VI concludes.
II. Background
A. Parental Medicaid Expansions
As noted above, historically most adults were eligible for Medicaid only if they received AFDC. As such, eligibility was limited to single mothers with very low income. Estimating linear probability models, the authors find 20 percent higher coverage rates in those states with an expansion. Of course, this analysis is subject to the same criticism as that of Lambrew (2001) , which is that underlying state differences related to the decision to expand family coverage may be correlated with Medicaid participation, thereby biasing the results. Likewise, in a single-state study, it is impossible to isolate the effects of the policy change from the effects of state-specific unobservable that are correlated with both the policy change and coverage rates.
Most recently, Duchovny and Busch (2002) employ a state fixed-effects approach to compare adult insurance coverage in 21 states that expanded parental eligibility to at least 100 percent of the FPL to coverage in the remaining states. They report that such expansions increased adult coverage by about 3 percentage points. As discussed above, the state fixed-effects approach identifies the effects of the parental eligibility expansions only if any unobservable influences that may be correlated with state policy choices are time-invariant.
III. Empirical Approach
An important difference between the approach we adopt here and the approach adopted by others is that we include only expansion states in our analysis. Comparing the target and below-target groups within expansion states allows us to relax the assumption, implicit in the state fixed-effects approach, that the unobservable determinants of state policy choices are time-invariant. As a result, out approach provides more general controls for potential policy endogeneity.
Our empirical model can be written as
The dependent variable C ist is a dummy indicating whether the ith sample member in the sth state at time t has coverage, where coverage may mean Medicaid, private, or any coverage, depending on the model. The variable T ist is the target-group dummy, which is equal to one if the ith family's income exceeded the sth state's AFDC-related income eligibility limit. In years prior to the expansion, the AFDC-related IEL is based on the AFDC payment standard, deductions, and disregards in effect in year t. In years following the expansion, the AFDC-related IEL is based on the value of those parameters in the year prior to the expansion. The variable X st is the expansion dummy, which is equal to one in state s beginning with the year of the expansion. It is equal to zero in years preceding the expansion. The term T ist X st is an interaction between the target-group dummy and the expansion dummy. The coefficient on this key interaction term provides our estimate of the effect of the parental Medicaid expansions. The vector Z ist represents family characteristics, such as the mother's age, education, race, and number of children; the age of her youngest child; and a dummy indicating whether she was recently pregnant. The child regressions also include the child's age and a dummy for whether she is an infant.
The disturbance term consists of two components, a st and e ist . The latter is an idiosyncratic family-specific error term. The former, a st , is a term common to all families within a particular state during year t. It represents the influence of all arbitrarily timevarying characteristics of the state that could simultaneously affect coverage and the timing of the state's parental-eligibility expansion. This includes other policy choices, such as the timing and nature of the state's welfare reform plan, its Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility rules for children, as well as other influences, such as the condition of the state economy. Including dummy variables for each state-year cell in the regression models provides implicit controls for all such factors. Because the estimates are based on between-group differentials within expansion states in the context of a model that controls for state and year effects, we refer to them as " within-state difference-indifference" estimates.
In the presence of state-year dummy variables, the parameter associated with the expansion dummy is not identified. Indeed, none of the effects of any variable that varies only by state and year, such as welfare reform, the unemployment rate, or the generosity of other state-sponsored health insurance programs, can be identified, since such variables are collinear with the state-year dummies. This reveals why the state-year dummies control for policy endogeneity: they control implicitly for all factors that vary at the state level, regardless how they may vary over time.
One possibility not accounted for by the model in equation (1) is that some factors may have different effects on the target and below-target groups. Welfare reform is a particularly important example. Since families in the target group are generally incomeineligible for welfare, welfare reform should have little direct effect on them. However, given the important historical links between welfare and Medicaid coverage, one might expect welfare reform to have important effects on the coverage of the below-target group, whose members are income-eligible for welfare by construction.
Failing to account for such a possibility could bias our results. To account for this problem, we interact the target-group dummy with a welfare reform dummy as well as the annual state unemployment rate and, in the child regressions, the income-eligibility thresholds associated with the state's poverty-related Medicaid and SCHIP programs.
The welfare reform dummy is equal to one beginning with the year in which the state implemented its TANF program; poverty-related Medicaid and SCHIP income-eligibility thresholds are expressed relative to the FPL. We include these interactions in all the regression models reported below.
IV. Data
Data on insurance coverage are taken from the March CPS surveys administered between 1995 and 2002. Because the surveys provide information regarding coverage in the previous calendar year, the sample period extends effectively from 1994 to 2001. As mentioned above, the CPS insurance coverage questions were changed in 1995. The questions were reordered, question wording changed and questions on coverage through "other health insurance plans" were added.
5 In addition, the sample frame was updated in 1995 (as it is every decade to reflect changes in the population distribution uncovered by 13 the decennial census). How these changes affected estimates of health insurance coverage has been explored elsewhere. Swartz (1997) Columbia, which provides the most generous parental Medicaid eligibility.
6 Table 2 provides insurance coverage rates from our sample of low-income families. For both mothers and children, we provide estimated coverage rates both before and after the parental-eligibility expansions. We consider Medicaid coverage, private coverage, and any coverage, defined as coverage from either Medicaid or a private plan.
Panel A provides coverage rates for Medicaid. Before the eligibility expansions, Medicaid covered 43.4 percent of mothers and 55.9 percent of children in the belowtarget group, that is, in families with incomes below the AFDC-related IEL. The difference in coverage is probably related to differences in eligibility. Before the parental 6 We exclude from the sample families in which anyone receives SSI or "other government insurance" which largely includes coverage through the military and Medicare. Coverage under both types is subject to policy changes that are independent of the adult Medicaid expansions studied here but may have occurred at roughly the same time. As such we exclude both categories so as better isolate the effect of the adult Medicaid expansions. Private coverage rates are presented in Panel B. Within the below-target group, private coverage rose for both mothers and children. This is consistent with other reports of increasing private coverage among low-income families during much of our sample period (Broaddus, et al., 2002) . Among target-group mothers, private coverage rose less;
among target-group children, it fell. Relative to the below-target groups, private maternal coverage fell 3.5 percentage points and private child coverage fell by 4.8 percentage points. In the absence of other influences that may have affected private coverage, this would suggest that the parental-eligibility expansions were responsible for some crowding-out of private coverage.
Finally, Panel C presents rates of coverage from either private sources or
Medicaid. The simple within-state difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the probability of having any coverage among both mothers and children rose by about 4 percentage points. As a whole, the difference-in-difference estimates in Table 2 suggest that the parental-eligibility expansions increased insurance coverage by raising Medicaid coverage while reducing private coverage by a lesser amount. Of course, these estimates are valid only if the parental-eligibility expansions were the only factor influencing coverage differentials between the target and below-target groups. However, as we argued above, welfare reform, the economy, and the implementation of SCHIP could have affected insurance coverage differently between the two groups. In the next section, we present estimates that control for such differences. Table 3 presents results from the regression models discussed in section III. We focus first on the results for mothers, presented in columns (1) The next row of Table 3 suggests why the regression estimate of the effect of the parental-eligibility expansions on Medicaid coverage is smaller than the simple withinstate difference-in-difference estimate presented in Table 2 . In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction between the target-group dummy and the welfare reform dummy is positive and significant. Taken at face value, it indicates that welfare reform raised Medicaid coverage within the target group, relative to the below-target group, by 5.9 percentage points. Put equivalently and more intuitively, it indicates that welfare reform reduced Medicaid within the below-target group, relative to the target group, by 5.9 percentage points. Since the target-group was income-ineligible for welfare, and thus unlikely to be directly affected by welfare reform, this estimate suggests that welfare reform reduced maternal Medicaid coverage within the income-eligible population by nearly 6 percentage points. This is roughly consistent with estimates from some welfare reform experiments (Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman 2002, chapter 6) .
V. Results
Accounting for the effect of welfare reform on the below-target group explains why the estimate of the effect of the parental Medicaid expansions on maternal Medicaid coverage is so much smaller than the simple within-state difference-in-difference estimate in Table 2 . The simple estimate attributes the entire post-expansion change in between-group coverage differentials to the parental eligibility expansions. The regression estimate attributes the decline in coverage within the below-target group to welfare reform, and attributes only the net change in between-group coverage differentials to the parental Medicaid expansions.
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In the next row of the table, the coefficients on the target group-unemployment interaction indicates that the economy had similar effects on mothers in both the target and below-target groups. Beyond that, the signs of the other coefficients in the model are Estimates for children are reported in columns (4) through (6) of Table 3 Neither the Medicaid nor CHIP income-eligibility have significantly different effects on the coverage of children in the target group, relative to those in the below-target group.
Despite the general qualitative similarities between the maternal and child coverage results, there is an important quantitative difference. The estimated effects of the parental eligibility expansions are greater for children than for their parents.
Although this potentially could be the result of disproportionate take-up among large families, some analysis revealed that it resulted largely from inappropriately pooling the data by race and ethnicity. Table 4 presents results disaggregated by race and ethnicity, where only the key coefficients are shown in order to save space. 11 Once the sample is stratified, the effects of the parental Medicaid expansions are more similar between mothers and their children.
11 The unusual racial/ethnic distributions implicit in the sample sizes stem from the fact that we include only expansion states in the sample. The presence of California and New York account for the relative abundance of Hispanics; the near-absence of Southern states accounts for the relative dearth of blacks. We have omitted a fourth "other race/ethnicity" group from Table 4 due to small sample sizes.
Some further analysis revealed that the differences that remain can be explained by the fact that the expansions had larger effects on larger families, suggesting that take-up rates were larger for families with more children.
More importantly, disaggregating the sample by race and ethnicity reveals that the effects of the parental Medicaid expansions vary importantly along these lines. The expansions slightly reduced coverage of white mothers and slightly increased coverage of white children. However, none of these effects are significant In contrast, the expansions had substantial effects on both blacks and Hispanics. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explain why these differences arise, we offer one suggestion. In the pre-expansion period, 73.5 percent of white mothers in the target group had private insurance coverage. Among black and Hispanic mothers, the respective percentages were 65.3 and 49.4. To the extent that demand for public coverage is increased by lack of private coverage, these pre-existing 22 differences in private coverage may help explain the differential effects of the parental Medicaid expansions.
We can also calculate the extent to which the parental eligibility expansions altered racial and ethnic disparities in insurance coverage. In the pre-expansion period, 81.2 percent of white mothers in the target group had some sort of insurance coverage.
Among black and Hispanic mothers, the corresponding percentages were 78.1 and 57.7.
On the basis of the estimates in column (3) 
VI. Conclusions
Since the 1990s, many states have sought to expand eligibility for Medicaid to poor parents who were not receiving welfare. Our results show modest increases in 23 health insurance coverage as a result of the expansions. There also appear to be considerable spillover effects with respect to insurance coverage among children of newly eligible parents.
Our results also show substantial differences in the effects of the parental eligibility expansions by race. Whereas the expansions had little effect on whites, they had significant and generally sizeable effects on blacks and Hispanics. As a result, the expansions generally contribute to reducing racial differences in insurance coverage.
Among children, they expand the slight advantage faced by black children as compared to whites.
Whether the recent gains in coverage are likely to persist is not clear. Recent growth in unemployment presumably would increase take-up, as newly jobless families lose access to employer-provided coverage. At the same time, however, pressing fiscal issues may lead the states to scale back their expansions or delay those that had been planned for the future Table 3 as well as a full set of state-year dummies.
